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Morris: The Use of Set-Off, Counterclaim and Recoupment: Availability aga
THE USE OF SET-OFF, COUNTERCLAIM AND
RECOUPMENT: AVAILABILITY AGAINST
COMMERCIAL PAPER
Wmr.A

0. MoRMs*

The question as to whether a defendant when sued upon a
negotiable instrument may claim the benefit of a set-off, counterclaim or recoupment against the plaintiff has resulted in more than
an ordinary amount of difficulty, uncertainty and confusion in the
various courts of this country. In spite of the enactment by all the
states of either the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act or Uniform
Commercial Code and in many states modem rules, there is to this
day a lack of complete uniformity in the decisions respecting the
use of a set-off, counterclaim or recoupment when a negotiable
instrument is involved. However, it does appear that the courts in
the majority of jurisdictions are striving to reach uniform and consistent results. The decisions are definitely showing a pattern
based upon rather sound reasoning. While much of this article
deals with the laws of West Virginia, it will for the most part express the views of the courts of the majority of jurisdictions. The
variations will be found in some state decisions because of statutory modifications and rules of courts. The West Virginia decisions
and statutes appear to represent fairly the most acceptable views on

this subject.
The discussion of this matter will for the most part be limited
to the consideration of the use of set-off, counterclaim and recoupment as a device for endeavoring to reduce or deny to the plaintiff
recovery in an action based on the negotiable instrument. For a
complete understanding of the problems and the terminology used,
it is necessary for background purposes to examine and consider
the general laws relating to the use of set-off, counterclaim and
recoupment as used by the defendant when sued by the assignee,
as distinguished from an indorsee, of a nonnegotiable chose. This
will permit a comparison of their availability in litigation involving
actions on either a negotiable or nonnegotiable claim.
It is elementary that choses in action whether negotiable or
non negotiable, other than those which might be considered highly
personal in nature,1 illegal, immoral or containing a restriction
Associate Professor of Law, West Virginia University.
iBruck v. Taylor, 152 U.S. 634 (1894); Delaware County v. Diebold Safe
& Lock Co., 183 U.S. 473 (1889); Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden
Mining Co., 127 U.S. 379 (1888).
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against an assignment 2 may be transferred from one owner to another party, designated as an assignee, without the consent of the
obligor. One's rights in a negotiable instrument may be transferred
by either an assignment or a negotiation. Every negotiation by
necessity includes all the elements of an assignment, it is equally
clear that not every assignment constitutes a negotiation. It should
be observed that a true negotiation of order paper may only be accomplished when a negotiable instrument which is payable to the
order of a designated party, or negotiable paper which was originally payable to the order of a designated party has been indorsed
specially, is substantially indorsed by the payee or special indorsee
and delivered to the recipient. If the negotiable instrument were
originally payable to bearer or had been indorsed in blank by the
proper party, it may subsequently be negotiated to another party by
mere delivery, no indorsement being necessary. Negotiation occurs
only with the transfer of a negotiable chose when done in such a
manner as to enable the acquirer thereof to qualify as a holder3
of the instrument. The term assignment is used to identify the
transfer of a nonnegotiable claim or the transfer of negotiable
order paper by mere delivery so as to vest title to the claim in the
assignee. 4
One acquiring an instrument by negotiation may, but does not
always, acquire a superior position than one who comes into possession of the instrument merely by an assignment. This results
from the fact that one acquiring an instrument by a negotiation
may qualify as a holder in due course of the instrument and thus
be free of personal defenses which might have been available if
pleaded against a prior party. It is basic law that those defenses
which are purely personal in nature may not be used against a
holder in due course of a negotiable instrument The assignee of a
negotiable instrument enjoys relatively the same rights as an as2 Lafue v. Groezing, 84 Cal. 281, 24 Pac. 42 (1890); Lockerby v. Amon,
164 Wash. 24, 116 Pac. 463 (1911); White v. Raleigh Wyoming Mining Co.,

113 IN.Va. 522, 168 S.E. 798 (1933).
;3"Holder means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession
of it, or bearer thereof." W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 17 § 1 (Michie 1955);
UNnwo
m NEGOTIABLE Nsxtu mzrs LA~w § 121.
Federal
Intermediate Credit Bank v. Carolina Petroleum Co., 154 S.C. 435,
151 S.E.
738
(1930).
4
The term assignment should be limited in its application to the transfer
of intangible rights as distinguished from the transfer of tangible property.
In re Beffa's Estate, 54 Cal. App. 186, 201 Pac. 616 (1921); REsTATEMENT,
CommArrs § 149(1) (1932).
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signee of a nonnegotiable chose for in either case any defense
which would have been available against the assignor will likewise
be available against a claim made by the assignee of either a
negotiable or nonnegotiable instrument.
RiTcrr OF AN AssIGNEE TO INSTITUTE SUIT IN AssIGNEEs NAM'iE

Whether an assignee may institute an action in his name or

must maintain the action in the name of the assignor for his benefit
is now governed in most states by statute.
It has been held in a number of cases that an assignee only
acquires the equitable title to the chose by an assignment. In the
cases so holding, and. in the absence of statute, the assignee would
be denied the right to institute a law action thereon in his own
name, but would have to institute the action in the name of the last
holder of the legal title for the assignee's use.5
In those states in which a real party in interest statute has been
adopted, or the legislature has otherwise enacted permissive legislation, the assignee is at least permitted to sue in his own name. In
these states the question whether the assignee acquired the legal or
merely the equitable title to the claim is now for the most part only
of academic importance.
At common law the transferee of negotiable paper acquired the
equitable title to the claim and was only permitted to institute an
action thereon in the name of the last holder of the legal title for
his use.6

The West Virginia Code, ch. 33, art. 8, sec. 9, codifies the right
of an assignee to sue on the assigned claim by the following language: "The assignee of any bond, note, account, or writing, non5 Coffin v. Talbot, 110 Fla. 131, 148 So. 184 (1933); Country Home
Light &Power Co. v. J. J. Fitzgerald Co., 219 Ky. 313, 292 S.W. 833 (1927).

6 Stegal v. Union Bank & Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 438, 176 S.E.

438, 446 (1934):
"This was true because the assignee took only the equitable title to

the instrument. He could not sue thereon in his own name either in
equity or at law. The suit or action had to be brought by, or in the
name of the assignor, for the benefit of the assignee. Whether the
suit was brought in equity or at law, the assignee stood at the bar in
fact as in name in all respects in the shoes of the assignor .... "
Two exceptions to the above stated rule were enumerated, but neither are
important here.
The assignee was from an early date permitted to sue at law in the name
of the assignor. Master v. Miller, 4 Term Re. 330 (1791).
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negotiable . . . may maintain an action in his own name, without
the addition of 'assignee'; ... but shall allow all just defenses and

set-off, not only against himself, but against the assignor, before
the defendant had notice of the assignment." 7 Clearly under the
plain language of this statute, the assignee of a nonnegotiable chose
is entitled to institute the action in his own name in any West Virginia court, and the defendant is permitted to use a set-off, counterclaim or recoupment against the assignee of any claim which he
might have had against the payee or obligee. It would not seem to
be important in West Virginia and those states having similar
statutes to determine whether the assignee of a nonnegotiable chose
has or has not acquired the legal title to the assigned claim. In an
interesting, but somewhat complicated and confusing case, involving an assignment of an insurance policy, the court found that even
though the assignee had only acquired the equitable title thereto
and that the legal title was in the assignor, the assignee with only
the equitable title might maintain an action thereon in his own
name or in the name of the assignor for his use."
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in referring to
this case stated: "The application of 55-8-9 to a transferee of a
negotiable note is precluded by the language used therein, the
right to maintain an action at law being conferred on the assignee
of any.

. .

note ...

not negotiable."9 The passing of the maturity

date of the instrument does not in and of itself change a negotiable
instrument into a nonnegotiable instrument.10 The fact that the
7

:Bentley v. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 40 W. Va. 729, 28 S.E. 584 (1895).
The Bentley case involved the assignment of an insurance policy in which the
court held that in West Virginia an assignee acquired an equitable title to
the chose, that the legal title remained in the assignor; and that the assignee
under the statute could sue either in his own name or in the name of the
assignor for his use.
Garland v. Richeson, 25 Va. (4 Rand.) 266 (1826).
8 Zbid.
9
Odland v. Hamrick, 127 W. Va. 206, 218, 32 S.E.2d 629 683 (1945).
It should be here observed that the West Virginia court stated in the Odland
case that "An action on a negotiable note which is not payable to bearer,
commenced by the payee and holder, who by special indorsement transfers the
note by another person during the pendency thereof abates, but may be revived
under Code 56-8-5." Even where the note passes after its maturity date
W. VA. CODE, ch. 44, art 8, § 9 (Michie 1955) is not applicable.
Davis v. Miller, 55 Va. (14 Gratt) 1 (1857).
lo W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 3, § 17 (Michie 1955); UNwoanm NEGOTIABLE
INSTmUMENTs LAw § 47; Bernstein v. Pacific States Sav. & Loan Co., 19 Cal.
App.2d. 679, 66 P.2d 699, (1937); Reall v. Russell, 134 N.Y.S. 391, 238 App.
Div. 262 (1983); Federal Trust Co. v. Nelson, 221 Iowa 759, 266 N.W. 509
(1936); Lane v. Hyder, 163 Mo. App. 688, 147 S.W. 514 (1912).
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instrument has been indorsed specially and transferred without the
indorsement of the special indorsee likewise does not destroy the
negotiable character of the note.11 An instrument originally negotiable will continue to be a negotiable instrument until it has been
discharged or is restrictively indorsed.12
Section 35 of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act" provides that a holder of a negotiable instrument may sue in his own
name by the following language: "The holder of a negotiable
instrument may sue thereon in his own name ... ." The troublesome portion of this section relates to the intended meaning of the
word "holder" as therein used. Section 191 of the same Act defines
holder as: "Holder means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note,
who is in possession of it, or the bearer thereof."' 4 It would follow
that one who acquires negotiable order paper by mere delivery
would not fit the definition of a holder but would only be a transferee thereof. If one acquires title to negotiable order paper by
delivery alone, as he may do by virtue of section 49 of the Uniform
Negotiable Instrument Act,'3 he would not qualify as a holder or
holder in due course until he received the indorsement of the payee
or special indorsee. For clearly such transferee is not the payee,
and not having acquired the instrument by an indorsement he
could not be said to be an indorsee. Such transferee for value acquires by the transfer all the rights of the transferor, plus the right
to demand the unqualified indorsement of the transferor if it has
been omitted by accident or mistake.,6 To determine whether the
transferee is a holder in due course we must look only at the situation and facts as they exist at the time the indorsement is actually
acquired and not as they were on the date of the transfer of possession of the instrument. Clearly the transferees rights in this
situation are somewhat greater than those of a mere assignee, in
11 The court held that a note payable to the First National Bank of Webster

Springs continued to be negotiable until restrictively indorsed or discharged.
The fact that it had been indorsed specially did not impair the negotiable
character thereof. Odland v. Hamrick, 127 W. Va. 206, 82 S.E.2d. 629 (1944)

Gulbranson-Dickinson Co. v. Hopkins, 170 Wis. 326, 175 N.W. 93 (1919)
12W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 3, § 17 (Michie 1955); UNwOBm NEcOmaurz
INsmmENTs LAw § 47; Oakdale Mfg. Co. v. Clarke, 29 R.I. 192, 69 At. 681
(1908).
1' W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 4, § 1 (Michie 1955).
14W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 17, § 1 (Michie 1955).
15 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 8, § 19 (Michie 1955).
16W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 3, § 19 (Michie 1955); U~rronm NEGOTI-nLE
INshmumEN-rs LAw § 49; Lawrence v. Citizens' State Bank, 113 Kan. 724, 216
Pac. 262 (1923); Cady v. Bay City Land Co., 102 Ore. 5, 201 Pac. 179 (1921).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960

5

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 3

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
that he may demand the indorsement of the transferor if his indorsement has been inadvertently omitted and he is a transferee for
value. But he is not in the favorable position of a holder in due
course until the indorsement is actually obtained; assuming the
other requirements to qualify as a holder in due course have been
met.11
It would be appropriate at this junction to inquire whether
such transferee for value of unindorsed order paper has by virtue
of the transfer acquired either the legal or equitable or both legal
and equitable title to the instrument. 18 The determination of this
question will also determine, in the absence of statute, whether the
transferee may institute the action thereon in his own name. Judge
Hatcher in Furbeev. Furbeein reviewing the rights of the transferee
under section 49 of the Act said: "This section changes the law
merchant by vesting in the transferee the entire title of the transferor whether legal or equitable or both."19 The court in permitting
the transferee to sue in his own name found that the rights acquired
by the transferee under section 49 included the right to institute
suit in his own name, thus giving to the transferee of unindorsed
order paper the same right to institute suit in his own name as was
given to an assignee of a nonnegotiable claim by chapter 55, art. 8,
sec. 9 of the West Virginia Code. The court continued the discussion of this matter by stating: This section (49) "vests [the title]
in the transferee without indorsement, and is not affected by section 30 * * * and if the transferor had the legal title this must pass
though subject to equities." 20 As section 49 of the Negotiable Instruments Act refers only to transferees for value it would seem
logically to follow that in West Virginia a transferee of unindorsed
negotiable order paper who had not given value therefor would not
r'"The fact that it is transferred without indorsement is sufficient to put
the transferee upon inquiry as to all equitable defenses that exist at the time
of the transfer. But a set-off is not a defense, as the term is ordinarily used."
Harrisburg Trust Co. v. Sherfeldt, 87 Fed. 669, 671 (9th Cir. 1898); Chandler
v. Drew, 6 N.H. 469 (1834).

Is Community Say. & Loan Co. v. Effort, 111 W. Va. 308, 161 S.E. 564

(1931); Rothwell v. Taylor, 303 IMI.226, 185 N.E. 419 (1922); Rivenburgh v.
Middleburg First Nat. Bank, 103 App. Div. 64, 93 N.Y.S. 652 (1905); "Some
courts hold that the transferee in good faith and for value become vested with
legal title; others hold transferee becomes vested with equitabel title." 1 JoYcE,
DEM-TsEs TO CoMnRancmiA PAPER § 663 (2d ed. 1907).
19 117 W.Va. 722, 188 S.E. 123 (1936).
2,id. at 723, 188 S.E. at 124 See, BAN-NoN, NEGOTsLE INSTRUMMErS
LAw § 49 (5th ed. 1926).
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be permitted to institute an action thereon in his own name.21 Not
being a holder for value, section 49 of the Act would not be applicable, and since it is a negotiable instrument chapter 58, art. 8,
sec 9 of the West Virginia Code heretofore discussed could not
apply to a negotiable instrument, being no statutory authorization
for a suit in the transferee's name, the common law would apply,
and require the action to be in the name of the assignor with legal
title for the benefit of the transferee.22 For neither under the law
merchant, common law2 3 nor the Uniform Act has the gratituous
transferee of a negotiable instrument been held to have acquired
legal title to the instrument in the absence of an indorsement by
the last holder of the legal title thereto. This point is well illustrated
by an interesting case in which an administrator of the estate of the
payee transferred without indorsement a negotiable instrument to
himself as the sole heir of the payee's estate. The transferee clearly
had not given value for the instrument nor could he qualify as a
holder of the note. The court ruled that the transferee had not by
virtue of section 49 of the Act acquired legal title to the instrument.2 4 The donee-transferee was thus denied the right to maintain an action on the negotiable instrument in his own name.
21 It will be observed that the act only refers to the transferees for value.
It has been held that neither under prior law nor under the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act did the gratutious transferee of a negotiable instrument acquire title to the instrument unless the transferor indorsed. Moore v.
Moore, 35 Ga.App. 39, 131 S.E. 922 (1926). Three years later the same court
stated that an administrator of the estate of the payee who transferred to
himself as sole heir certain promissory notes did not acquire legal title to the
notes by virtue of section 49, since such section only applies to holders for
value. Bond v. Maxwell, 40 Ga.App. 679, 150 S.E. 860 (1929).
However, in other jurisdictions it has been held that where the donor of
unindorsed negotiable instrument delivered same to the donee with intent to
make a gift thereof this was in and of itself sufficient to place the title to the
instrument in the donee. Brown v. Patella, 24 Cal. App.2d 362, 74 P.2d 119
(1938); Rinard v. Lasley, 143 IM. App. 450 (1908); In re Nitze, 121 Misc.
18, 200 N.Y.S. 781 (1923); Cosmopolitan Trust Co. v. Leonard Watch Co.,
249 Mass. 14, 143 N.E. 827 (1924); Baker v. Moran, 67 Ore. 386, 186 Pac.
30 (1913).
The rule as expressed by the court of Georgia and those other states following the Georgia rule follow the strict language if the statute, while the Massachusetts and California courts have reached a more sound conclusion by not
such a strict interpretation to the language of the statute.
applying
22
Whether the assignee acquires the legal or equitable title to the instrument may here be of some importance. It has been held in a number of cases
that the assignee only acquired the equitable title. Steinhilper v. Basnight,
153 N.C. 293, 69 S.E. 200 (1910); Woods v. Finley, 153 N.C. 497, 69 S.E.
502 (1910).
23 The transferee of negotiable paper at common law took only the equitable
title thereto and could not sue at law only in the name of the holder of the
legal 2title. Bank of Bromfield v. McKinley, 53 Cal. 279, 125 Pac. 493 (1912).
4 Moore v. Moore, 35 Ga. App. 39, 131 S.E. 922 (1926).
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The courts of some states by virtue of statute have permitted a
donee-transferee of unindorsed negotiable order paper to sue in his,
the assignee's, name. 25 As this is largely a matter of procedure, it is
difficult to see any reason under our modem concept of practice
for placing a donee-transferee in any different position than a transferee for value so far as his right to be the named plaintiff.
To summarize the law in general and in West Virginia specifically, we might state: 1. An assignee of a nonnegotiable chose
may by virtue of statute sue on the assigned claim in his own name
or in the name of the assignor for the benefit of the assignee. 2. A
holder or holder in due course of a negotiable instrument may by
virtue of the language of section 51 of the Uniform Negotiable
Instruments Act file the action in his own name. 3. The transferee
for value of a negotiable instrument has been held to have the
right to institute an action thereon in his own name by virtue of
the court's interpretation of the meaning of section 49 of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument Act. 4. There is a definite split of
authority today whether a gratitutious transferee of a negotiable
instrument may maintain the action in his own name. No West
Virginia cases have been found directly involving this point.
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in dealing
with a transfer of a negotiable note after suit has been instituted
thereon, has said: "An action on a negotiable note which is not
payable to bearer, commenced by the payee and holder, who by
special indorsement transfers the note to another person during the
''
pendency thereof abates but may be revived under Code 56-8_5. 21
DRAvEi's lacrs

AcAINST

DAwEi's Fmms

At this point some consideration should be given to the question as to whether a check or bill operates as an assignment of the
funds which are in the hands of the drawee. Section 127 of the
Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act states:27 "A bill of itself does
not operate as an assignment of the funds in the hands of the drawee
available for payment thereof... ." While section 189 of the Act
states: "A check of itself does not operate as an assignment of any
part of the funds to the credit of the drawer with the bank ....
225

" 28

Hagge v. Drew, 73 Cal.App.2d. 739, 167 P2d 263 (1946).

6 Odland v. Hamrick, 127 W. Va. 206, 32 S.E.2d 629 (1944).
27 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 10, § 2 (Michie 1955).
2W.
VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 10, § 6 (Michie 1955).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol62/iss2/3

8

Morris: The Use of Set-Off, Counterclaim and Recoupment: Availability aga

USE OF SET-OFF, COUNTER CLAIM, RECOUPMENT 149
As neither a check nor bill operates as an legal assignment of any
part of the drawer's credit or funds, then it must follow that the
holder of such bill or check would not acquire any rights against
the drawee by virtue of owning or acquiring the bill or check,
unless and until the drawee has accepted the bill or certified the
check. If a check or bill be not an assignment then neither would
prevent the drawee from placing a claim against the drawer's funds
or credit whether by way of set-off or some type of lien. The bank
or other drawee is in a superior position to that of a bill or check
so far as the right to obtain a lien or set-off against these funds
or credits.
As between the drawer and the holder of a check, the check is
deemed to be an equitable assignment of the drawer's funds, 29 but
not such an assignment so far as the rights of the drawee are concerned.
The provision of section 18930 of the Act "[W ] as designed for
the protection of the bank rather than a provision effecting the
relation between the maker of a check and the payee, and as
against the drawer, the check should be considered an equitable
assignment pro tanto."31 The result of such a view is well illustrated in case of Hulings v. Hulings Lumber Co.3 2 wherein the
West Virginia court held that a check operated as an equitable
assignment from the time it was delivered as between the drawer
and holder. Thus a general assignment for the benefit of the
drawer's creditors after its delivery did not affect the rights of
the check holder.
29

The West Virginia court held that a check operates as an equitable assignmnent from the time it is delivered as between the drawer and holder; that
a general assignment made by the drawer for the benefit of his creditors after
its delivery does not defeat the right of the check holder. Hulings v. Hulings
Lumber Co. 88 W. Va. 351, 18 S.E. 620 (1893).
A che& is an equitable assignment of the drawer's funds as between the
drawer and holder and such assignment as far as the drawee is concerned.
NEGOTIABLE INSTRU-NTS § 1643 (6th ed. 1933).
2 DANiEL,
3
0 W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 16, § 6 (Michie 1955).
31
Central Trust Co. v. Bank of Mullens, 108 W. Va. 12, 19, 150 S.E.
187, 189 (1929).
But see Mountaineer Eng'r Co. v. Bossart, 133 W. Va. 668, 670, 57 S.E.2d
633, 684 (1955) wherein the court in distinguishing the Central Trust Co.
case said: "The statute does not deal directly with liability as between the
drawer and the drawee or where third parties may assert claims. It does say,
however, that a mere check, of itself, does not necessarily create an equitable
assignment."
32 38 W. Va. 351, 18 S.E. 620 (1893).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1960

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [1960], Art. 3
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

The Iowa court held that in equity an intent to assign makes
the check an equitable assignment of the drawer's funds and the
holder should be protected against subsequent claimants, not33
withstanding the negotiable instruments act.
REcouPMENT, SEr-oFF AND CouNTEcLAxvs

After having given consideration to who has the legal and
equitable title to the chose in the event of an assignment, and in
whose name and under what circumstances an action thereon may
be maintained, let us now examine the meaning and use of recoupment, set-off and counterclaim.
Recoupment
Recoupment at common law is defined as the "right of the
defendant, in the same action, to claim damages from the plaintiff,
either because he has not complied with some cross obligation of
the contract on which he sues, or because he has violated some
duty which the law imposes on him in the making or performing
the contract."

34

This remedy is of common law origin, and only enables the
defendant by pleading a claim of his own which grew out of the
same transaction to be used to diminish the amount of recovery
allowed to the plaintiff. In the absence of a statute the one using
recoupment would not obtain a recovery in excess of the sum
demanded by the plaintiff.3 5 Recoupment was and is purely a
method allowed for mitigating the amount of recovery to the plaintiff
and not a method of establishing an affirmative right to an amount
36
in excess of the plaintiff's claim.
38 Hove v. Stanhope State Bank, 138 Iowa 39, 115 N.W. 476 (1908).
3
BALLENTIn, LAw DICTIONARY (1931).
34
5

Recoupment may only be used to diminish the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery. In the absence of statutory authorization the defendant is not permitted to recover any damages in excess of the amount of the plaintiff's claim.
Baltimore R. Co. v. Jameson, 13 W. Va. 833 (1879).
It might be noted that where the defendant pleads a true set off as permitted by most statutes the amount allowed by the way of set off may exceed
the demand of the plaintiff. This allows a judgment for the balance in favor
of the defendant and against the plaintiff.
36 "The doctrine of recoupment rests upon the principle that it is just
and equitable to settle in one action, thus avoiding a multiplicity of suits, all
claims growing out of the same contract or transaction . ..
Recoupment is a
defense arising out of the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim." STORY,
EQurBLE Ju~asPRuDENcE § 878 (14th ed. 1918); Mayberry v. Leech, 58 Ala.

389 (1.877); Home Say. Bank v. Boston, 131 Mass. 277 (1881).
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set-off
Because of the apparent limitations on the use of a claim by
way of recoupment, the legislatures of all of our states have provided
a remedy of set-off. The use of a set-off as permitted today was
37
totally unknown to the common law.

Waterman in his work on Set-off states: "Set-off signifies the
subtraction or taking away one demand from another opposite or
cross demand, so as to extinguish the smaller demand and reduce
the greater by the amount of the less; or if opposite demands are
equal to extinguish both."38 It is then clear that a set-off is a

counter suit used both as a defense measure and as a basis of a
claim against the plaintiff based on a matter arising independently
of the cause on which the plaintiff is seeking recovery. 39 The claim
which the defendant is using as the basis of his right of set-off necessarily arises from an extrinsic obligation to that of the plaintiff.40
It is submitted that in England the use of a set-off was first
recognized and authorized by the Bankruptcy Act of 4 Anne, ch.
17, sec. 11 of 1705. By 1729 the statute of 2 George 11, ch. 22,
sec. 18 expressly authorized the use of set-offs in the following
language: "Where there are mutual debts between the plaintiff and
defendant, or if either party sue or be sued as excutor or administrator where there are mutual debts between the testator or intestate
and either party, one debt may be set against the other. ..

."

Six

years later in 1785 by the enactment of 8 George 11, ch. 24, sec. 6
the right of set-off was further enlarged and amplified, section 6
providing: "Mutual debts may be set against each other, either
by being pleaded in bar, or given in evidence on the general issue,
notwithstanding such debts are deemed in law to be of different
nature.... And in case the plaintiff shall recover in such action or

suit, judgment shall be entered for no more than shall appear to be
truly and justly due the plaintiff after one debt being set-off against
the other as aforesaid."4 1
37

Spurr v. Snyder, 35 Conn. 172 (1868); WA n-mua, Smr-orr § 10 (2d
ed. 1872).
38
WATERMAx, Sxr-oFF § 1 (2d ed. 1872).
3
9"Technically speaking, a set-off is a counter demand which the defendant
holds against the plaintiff arising out of a transaction extrinsic to the plaintiffs

cause of action." Avery v. Brown, 31 Conn. 398 (1863).
40The distinction between payment of set-off has been tersely expressed
thus: A payment is by consent of the parties, either express or implied, appropriated to the discharge of the debt." WATEBm-A, Snr-or § 1 (2d ed. 1872).
41Stowers v. Barnard, 32 Mass. (15 Pick) 221 (1834).
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The Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in the footnotes to
the case of Stegal v. Union Bank and Federal Trust Co.42 stated:
"Setting off at law cross-demands arising from unconnected transactions was introduced in Virginia long before it was allowed in
England. The first statute of set-offs enacted in Virginia was the
act of 1644-45 (1 Hen. St. 276). This, so far as we have been able
to ascertain, was the first statute of set-offs enacted in any state or
country which has the English common law as the basis for its legal
43
system."
Chapter 56, art. 5, see. 4 of the West Virginia Code is the source
of the law of this state relating to the right of set-off in this state. By
careful examination of this portion of the code one would find that
five essential conditions must exist to enable the defendant to claim
the right of set-off. These conditions are discussed and enumerated
in a note in the West Virginia Law Review, and may be set forth as
follows: "1. The plaintiff's demand must be in the nature of a debt,
2. The demand proposed to be set-off must also be in the nature
of a debt, and not a claim for unliquidated damages, but may be
either legal or equitable, 3. The demands must be due between the
same parties, 4. The debts must be due in the same right, and 5.
44
The debts to be set-off must be due and payable."
A.set-off then is not a defense within the meaning of the term
"defense" as a fact which may be set up as a bar to an action, but
is a cross suit or action. 45 To constitute a set-off the defendant must
42 163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438 (1984).
43 The court in the Stegal case, id. at 435, 176 S.E. at 445, said the
question involved was:
"Does a post maturity transferee of a negotiable instrument, who is a
bona fide purchaser for value thereof from the payee, take it subject
to a mere set-off (as distinguished from a payment and from a matter
of recoupment) existing against the payee at the time of the transfer?"
The court went on to say "our examination of this question convinces
us that it must be answered in the negative, both under the law as it
existed in Virginia prior to the enactment of the Negotiable Instruments Law and under the law as it now exists....
"Under the common law, cross-demands arising out of unconnected
transactions require separate actions for their enforcement. And,
save in a few cases which present peculiar equities, a defendant
cannot avail himself of such a cross-demand against the plaintiff to
prevent a recovery, in whole or in part, on his promise, without
statutory authority for its being done. A mere cross-demand was not an
equity which could be pleaded even in a court of chancery. Therefore, prior to the enactment of a statute of set-off, there was no
occasion for the question here under considered to have arisen."
44 Note, 28 W. VA. LAw RE v. 139 (1922).

45 "Under an unbroken line of decisions, in so far as I am informed it has
been held that the right of set-off of an independent claim is neither a defense
nor an equity, and was unknown at common law. It is purely a statutory right
to satisfy one demand by another, and thus prevent several suits between the
same parties, when the whole controversy could be settled in one suit." Worden
v. Gillett, 275 Fed. 654, 656 (1921).
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allege facts which would in themselves constitute an independent

cause of action.46 As the right to claim a set-off is a precedural

matter, the laws of the forum determines its availability.47 The
defendant is denied the right to show the existence of a set-off or

counterclaim under a plea of payment. 48 The defendant setting up
such matters as recoupment, or set-off or counterclaim has the burden of proof.4 9 The converse is likewise true, where the defendant
pleads a set-off evidence of payment may not be properly introduced under this plea nor may want of consideration.

Counterclaim
The right to use a counterclaim, like the right to use a set-off,
was unknown at common law.50 The term counterclaim as used
in our statutes generally includes the right of recoupment where
the defendant's claim arises from the same transaction as that of
the plaintiff. For a demand to be permitted as a counterclaim, it
must have developed from the same obligation which formed the
basis of the plaintiff's suit.5 1
The only source of statute law in West Virginia dealing with the
use of counterclaims is found in chapter 50, art. 5, sections 1 to 6.
This chapter applies only to practice before justices of the peace.
West Virginia has no statute applicable to counterclaims in circuit
courts. Section 1 authorizes the use of a counterclaim in the following language: "If the plaintiff's demand in the action be found
on a judgment or contract, express or implied, the defendant may
46
STORY, EQUrrABLE JURISPRUDENCE § 1870 (14th ed. 1918); Kennedy v.
Davisson, 46 W. Va. 433, 83 S.E. 291 (1899).
47 If the plaintiff institutes an action in a given state he must be satisfied
with the rights given to the defendant regarding the use of a claim of set-off.
Davis v. Noll, 38 W. Va. 66, 17 S.E. 791 (1893); 1 DANIEL, NEGOTLABLE

INsTmmNTs

§ 890 (6th ed. 1933).

4sDixie Industrial Co. v. Bank of Wetumpka, 207 Ala. 293 92 So. 786
Bingham v. Domer, 94 Wash. 253, 162 Pac. 355 (19171.
(1922);
49
lecoupment used as a defense see, Spiro v. Shapleigh Hardware Co.,
153 Miss. 81, 118 So. 429 (1928).
As to burden of proof when counterclaim is asserted see: Kilgore v. Arant,
25 Ala. App. 356, 146 So. 540 (1933); In re Federal Trust Co., 227 Mo. App.
49, 51 S.W.2d 147 (1932). Where defendant in an action by assignee of a
sealed note pleaded as a counterclaim items for freight advanced to the original
payee, and plaintiff did not repay or deny claim, the burden was on the
defendant to prove the alleged counterclaim. Republic State Bank v. Bailey
Furniture & Lumber Co., 102 S.C. 329, 86 S.E. 680 (1915). Accord, Worden
v. Gillett, 275 Fed. 654 (1921); Stevens v. Gregg, 89 Ky. 461, 12 S.W. 775
(1890); Orr v. Barnett, 51 S.E. 607, 216 N.W. 347 (1927).
GOBloom v. Lehman, 29 Ark. 489 (1876); Hurst, Miller Co., v. Everett,
91 N.C. 399 (1884).

51 Ibid.
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set forth as a counterclaim a cause of action against the plaintiff,
whether liquidated or not, arising directly out of the contract or
transaction set forth in the complaint as the foundation of plaintiff's demand, or a liquidated demand founded on a judgement or
contract, express or implied, whether arising out of the same contract
or not; but every counterclaim shall be subject to the following
provisions: . . . "
It was unfortunate that the judges of the common law courts
felt themselves unable or were at least unwilling to permit one
defending a law action to show that the plaintiff was indebted to
him on another contract, or was indebted to the defendant on the
same obligation for an amount in excess of that claimed by the
plaintiff. It was clearly because of this inadequacy, and necessity
being the mother of invention, that the legislatures established the
right of set-off and counter claim to fill the void caused by the
inadequacy of the remedy afforded by the right of common law
recoupment.
To summarize the similarities and dissimilarities between the
rights under a claim of recoupment, set-off and counterclaim it
might be stated as follows: 1. Recoupment may only be pleaded
by the way of a defense to mitigate the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery. The amount claimed need not be for a liquidated amount,
but must arise from the same transaction that supported the plaintiffs claim. 2. The right to use a set-off is of statutory origin, must
be for a liquidated amount, need not be for a sum equal to or less
than that claimed by the plaintiff, and would involve an extrinsic
demand to that of the plaintiff. 3. The counterclaim is more or
less of a cross between a claim by way of recoupment and one of
set-off. The amount claimed by way of counterclaim need not be
liquidated need not be for a sum equal to or less than that claimed
by the plaintiff, but must arise from and be connected with the same
transaction which forms the basis of the claim of the plaintiff.
But for the statutory authority creating the doctrine of set-off
and counterclaim, a defendant who held a claim in excess of that
of the claimant had to either resort to a separate action at law or
pray that the court of equity would set-off or discount the amount
of his claim from the adversary's judgment. It is obvious that such
a procedure was entirely unsatisfactory in many situations.
We may now advance to consider in what situations an assignee
or holder of negotiable instrument my encounter a claim of recoupment, set-off or counterclaim when suing on the instrument.
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lEcouprvtmr, SEr-oFF A-D CouNrERcLmn
As USED AGANST AN ASSIGNEE

To place the discussion in proper perspective to the principal
problem, some consideration must be given to the rights of an assignee of a nonnegotiable chose when met with defendants claim
which he held against the assignor by way of a plea of recoupment,
set-off or counterclaim when sued by the assignee.52
It is generally recognized that an assignee acquires by the assignment the same rights in the chose as were enjoyed by the assignor5 3
The assignee may protect himself from such claims by making
inquiry of the debtor before accepting the assignment. If the debtorthird party in answer to the inquiry states that he has no claim of
set-off or other claim against the assignor, the assignee would be
protected against a future assertion of a set-off or claim by the
doctrine of estopped.5 4 Otherwise the debtor might claim any set-off
against the assignee which he would have had if sued by the assignor
instead of by the assignee.
B.~coupAnr, Szr-oP7 AND

CouNTE CLnv

AGAiNST A NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENT

Section 58 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act5 5 provides: "In the hands of any holder other than a holder in due
course, a negotiable instrument is subject to the same defences
as if it were nonnegotiable. . . ." This section raises the question
whether a prior party to a negotiable instrument may claim the
right of recoupment, set-off or counterclaim against a transferee
other than a holder in due course.
If a negotiable bill or note finds its way into the hands of a
holder in due course, or a holder with the rights of a holder in due
course, clearly the defendant when sued on the instrument would
be denied the right to assert a claim by the way of recoupment,
set-off or counterclaim which he held against a prior owner of the
52 See Sanborn v. Little, 3 N.H. 539 (1826) for an early discussion on
this matter.
53
Utica Ins. Co. v. Power, 3 Page (N.Y.) 365 (1832); BUjM., ASSIGNmwnsrs 483 (2d ed.).
54 By the way of analogy "Under the common law a payment made to
the payee of a nonnegotiable instrument at any time before the promisor
received notice that the instrument had been assigned to another was a defense
pro-tanto to the instrument in the hands of the assignee." Stegal v. Union Bank
& Fed. Trust Co., 163 Va. 417, 176 S.E. 438 (1934).
55W. VA. CoDE ch. 46, art. 4, § 8 (Michie 1955).
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bill or note. Of course any set-off which the defendant held personally against the plaintiff may be asserted successfully. If the
right of set-off was against a prior holder of the instrument, the
right to use the set-off is lost with the negotiation of the instrument
to a holder in due course or a holder with the rights of a holder
in due course.5 6
In the event that the defendant pleads and proves a right of
set-off as a cause of action, the burden is thereafter on the plaintiff
to prove that he is in fact a holder in due course of the instrument
or that he can trace his title through a prior holder in due course.
One is not denied as a matter of law the status of a holder in due
course merely because he knew that a counterclaim or set-off might
57
come into existence before the maturity of the instrument.
In discussing this problem one should not lose sight of the
wording of section 49 of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act58
which states: "Where the holder of an instrument payable to his
order transfers it for value without indorsing it, the transfer vests
in the transferee such title as the transferor had therein...." Such
a transfer as referred to in this section amounts to an assignment
56 "Holding only the equitable title it naturally follows that the assignee
took the instrument or claim subject to all defenses and other equities (in favor
of the promisor) with which it was encumbered in the hands of the assignor
and subject further to any equity which the original promis'sor had acquired
since the assignment but be ore receiving notice thereof." BiGLOW, BILLs,
NoTEs & CHECxS § 10 (3rd ed. Lile 1928).
. . . [N]o set-off can be allowed the maker of a negotiable instrument
against a purchaser thereof for value before maturity even though he had notice
the claim." First Nat'l Bank v. Danser, 70 W. Va. 529, 532, 74 S.E. 628,
624 (1912).
The case of Manufacturers' Fin. Corp. v. Vye-Neill Co., 62 F.2d 625
(1933) is worth examining at this point. Vye-Neill Co., the drawee and
acceptor of a trade acceptance drawn by Freed-Eiseman Radio Corp., payable
to Freed-Eiseman Radio Corp. The trade acceptance was indorsed by FreedEisenmn Radio Corp., and delivered to Earle Corp., which in turn negotiated
the instrument by delivery to the plaintiff a holder in due course. The plaintiff
sued the acceptor which in turn counterciaimed by way of set-off, consisting of
sixty items, both against trade acceptance and also against the account on which
the second count was based. The plaintiff being a holder in due course, no
right of set-off as between the defendant and the Freed Corp. is available
against the plaintiff, and the plaintiff is entitled to recover under the first count
the face amount of the trade acceptance with interest.
Even though the plaintiff were not a holder in due course, if the trade
acceptance were taken in good faith and for value, by the weight of authority,
only equities connected with the transaction would be available. A Massachusetts act provided that a nonnegotiable instrument is subject to all "defenses" by the maker, but not that a counter claim or set-off is not a "defense"
in the sense in which that term is ordinarily used.
57 Elmo State Bank v. Hildebrand, 108 Ken. 705, 177 Pac. 6 (1918).
58 W. VA. CoDE cl. 46, art. 3 § 19 (Michie 1955).
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as distinguished from a negotiation. The recipient of a note in
accordance with this section may be generally treated as an assignee
of the instrument.5 9
While it may be said that the transferee of unindorsed order
paper acquires the bill or note subject to all equities and defenses
which were available against the transferor, the courts have experienced difficulty in determining what the legislature meant by the
terms equities and defenses. We must determine whether a claim
of recoupment or counterclaim is an equity and whether a set-off
is a defense.
Daniel in his work on Negotiable Instruments stated: "A set-off
is not an equity; and the general rule stated is qualified and restricted to those equities arising out of the bill or note transaction
itself, and the transferee is not subject to a set-off which would be
good against the transferor, arising out of a collateral matter."60
The courts of this land do not seem to follow the law as suggested
by Mr. Daniel. The deviations from Mr. Daniers statement will be

shown by the following cases.
The South Dakota court in a much cited case expressed the
law on this point in somewhat different terms. The South Dakota
Court speaking through Judge Miser said: "Therefore, whatever
may be the rule as to other defenses and equities, it may be fairly
stated that the set-off that may be enforced against a negotiable
promissory note transferred without indorsement, in good faith,
and for value, must be a set-off which existed as a present right
when the transfer was made. This is in accord with the language
of section 49, N. I. L. ....61
69 Community Say. & Loan Co. v. Eiford, 111 W. Va. 808, 161 S.E.
564 (1931).
603 DANIEL, NEGOTIABLE INSTsrrEs, § 1693 (1933).
61E executed his negotiable promissory note to Moody County Bank
for $221.50 due April 1, 1926. H bought note on January 18, 1926. Note not
endorsed by payee. On May 22, 1956, the bank was taken over by superintendent of banks for liquidation. On day of transfer 7 had on deposite $7.94.
When bank suspended business E had on deposit $133.22. E claims set-off of
$133.22 against H, banks transferee. Jury found H's first knowledge of transfer
of note obtained May 31, nine days after bank closed and allowed set-off of
$133.22.

The question thus raised: Is a negotiable promissory note, transferred
without written indorsement by a payee bank to a transferee in good faith
and for value, subject to an off-set infavor of the maker for the maker's balance
inthe bank, when the bank later becomes insolvent? The court here held that

the transferee, without indorsement, though in good faith and for value, takes
subject to equities and defenses, remains the rule. The fact that it is transferred without indorsement is sufficient to put the transferee upon inquity as to
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It seems to be now settled when a counterclaim existed for
the benefit of the maker of a negotiable promissory note against
the payee and existed at the time of the transfer to one other
than a holder in due course, it may likewise be available against
any subsequent transferee who may thereafter institute an action
thereon. 62 However, any recovery on the counterclaim must necessarily be for a sum equal to or less than that claimed by the transferee in his suit for there is no obligation on the part of the assignee of a note to be responsible for the debts or obligations of
the transferor.
It appears that most courts today will allow a claim of set-off
which had matured before the transfer of the negotiable note to
be used against a taker thereafter who for one reason or another is
unable to qualify as a holder in due course. The courts following
this doctrine erroneously treats a set-off on the same footing as a
defense pro tanto.
When the claim which is being used as the basis of a set-off
is shown to have arisen subsequent to the transfer of the instrument, the decisions have been consistent in denying its availability.
That is a claim which arose subsequent to the transfer of the instrument which forms the basis of the suit cannot be used against the
transferee thereof.
The Virginia court in Davis v. Miller stated: "But whatever
conflict of authority there may be upon the question, whether the
equities, subject to which an indorsee takes an overdue negotiable
all equitable defenses that exist at the time of the transfer. But a set-off is not
a "defense", as the term is ordinarily used.
The rule that a party taking an overdue bill or note takes it subject to
equities to which the transferor is subject does not extend so far as to admit
set-offs which might be available against transferor.
In Norton v. Foster, 12 Kan. 44 (1873) it was held that the right of the
maker to use, by way of defense, a counterclaim arising out of breach of the
contract for which the note was given was available against a past maturity
transferee, but not for any excess in amount of the note.
See
also Stevens v. Keegan, 103 Kan. 79, 172 Pac. 1025 (1918).
6
2 Itseems then that where the maker has a right to use a set-off or
counterclaim at the time of the assignment by the payee the right to use this
set-off or counterclaim is not lost by assignment of the note to one unable
to qualify as a holder in due course or holder with the rights of a holder in
due course. Of course the assignee would not qualify in his own right as a
holder in due course as not having taken the note by a negotiation.
Indorsee would acquire note after maturity sued the maker thereof who
successfully pleaded a set-off of a note given the maker by the payee. The
court allowed the defendant to show that the payee s note was intended as
evidence of payment of the principal note. Sargent v. Southgate, 22 Mass.
(5 Pick.) 312 (1827).
Failure of consideration was allowed as a defense against a post-maturity
assignee. Ford v. Thompson, 1 Head 265 (Tenn. 1858).
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note, embrace set-off in favor of the maker against the payee, existing at the time of the endorsement, I have been able to find no
case in which it was held, or even said, that set-off between the
parties, arising or acquired after the indorsement, even though with64
out notice thereof, are [sic] good against the endorsee."
In West Virginia the court would deny the right of set-off
against a transferee of a negotiable instrument, irrespective of
whether the set-off was obtained before or after the transfer of the
instrument.65 The West Virginia court expressed itself in this way:
"The common law, declared by the modem English decisions, is that the indorsee of an overdue bill or note takes it
subject to equities growing out of the transaction and existing
at the time of the transfer, not as to a set-off arising out of
collateral and wholly independent matters; and this though the
indorsee had notice, gave no consideration for, and took the
paper on purpose to defeat the off-set. This is now held to be
a fixed principle of commercial law, although several of the
States repudiate the doctrine, and all off-sets to be pleaded
which existed at the time, but not those procured after the
transfer."6 6
The court in determining that the passing of the maturity date did
not destroy the negotiable character of the instrument said: "[T] he
transferee takes it subject to such equities as attach to the note itself.
.." The court decided that the right of set-off is neither an equity
nor lien recognized by the law merchant as attaching to a negotiable
instrument, and a bona fide purchaser is not required to take notice
of an existing off-set in the absence of legislative action. If an off-set
63 Itis not imperative that the equities existed at the time of the creation of
the obligation. It is sufficient if the assignee can protect himself by inquiry
at the time of the assignment. Warner v. Whittaker, 6 Mich. 138 (1858);
Eldred v. Hazlett, 33 Pa. 307 (1858).
To be allowed as a set-off the claim asserted by the defendant must have
been owned by him at or before the time that the assignment took place.
Martine v Willis, 2 E.D. Smith 524 (N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1854); Duncan v. Stanton
& Ruger, 30 Barb. 533 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. 1859).
Until the claim which is sought to be used as a set-off has matured it
may be defeated as a set-off by an assignment by the owner of the primary
claim. This is true even though the assignor be insolvent and his claim has
not become payable when assigned. Myers v. Davis, 22 N.Y. 489 (1861);
Martin v. Kunzmnuller, 23 N.Y. Super. Ct. 16, aff'd 37 N.Y. 306 (1862).
Where a promissory note was transferred for value in good faith,
before maturity, the court denied the claim of set-off even though the assignee
knew of the claim of set-off before acquiring the instrument. Williams v. Brown,
41 N.Y. 486 (1866).
See, Keep v. Lord, 9 N.Y. Super. Ct. 78 (1853).
64
55 Va. 1, 8 (1857).
65
6 Davis v. Noll, 38 W. Va. 66, 17 S.E. 791 (1893).
Id. at 68, 17 S.E. at 791.
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was disallowed as a claim before the adoption of the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Act, then there is little reason to think that
the drafters of the act intended that section 5867 was to alter the
accepted common law rule.
It should be noted from the clear language in the Davis case
that there is a definite split of authority in this country as to whether
a claim arising from a separate transaction, but existing at the time
of the transfer, may be used to diminish the amount of the plaintiff's
recovery.
Fhe two leading cases cited for the allowance of a true set-off
09
against the transferee are Simpson v. Hall68 and Bissell v. Curran.
Both of these cases, however, were decided before the adoption of
the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act In both of these cases
the court seemed to treat a set-off purely as a defense. Ten other
states likewise follow this view.
In England and in at least ten states and the District of Columbia the courts have clearly denied the defendant the right of set-off
7o
against the transferee of negotiable paper.
In at least six states, Alabama, Iowa, Maine, New Hampshire,
Pennsylvania and Wisconsin, cases will be found both allowing
and disallowing the use of a set-off against a transferee of negotiable
paper.
A, careful search has disclosed no case in which the maker of
a negotiable note has been successful in pleading a claim by the
way of set-off which arose from an extrinsic transaction or claim
subsequent to the transfer of the instrument in question. Cases have
been found wherein the court denied the maker of a note the right
§ 8 (Michie 1955).
6847 Conn. 417 (1879). Action by the assignee of a negotiable note, the
6T W. VA. CODE ch. 46, art. 4,

defendant was permitted to plead as a set-off a claim rising from a separate

transaction.
69 69 IMI.20 (1873). Post-maturity purchaser of negotiable instrument held
to take subject to any defense that could have been employed had such been
brought by the original payee. If payee owned the maker any sum at the
date of the assignment, that amount could have been set-off.
See also, Hurdle v. Hanner 50 N.C. 860 (1858); Craighead v. Swartz,
219 Pa.
70 149, 67 Atl. 1003 (1907).
Lincoln v. Grant, 47 App. D.C. 475 (1919); Kilcrease v. White 6 Fla.
45 (1855); Roundtree v. Culpepper, 40 Ga. App. 629, 150 S.E. 859 ?1929);
Hankins v. Shoup, 2 Ind. 842 (1850); Annan v. Houck, 4 Gill. 325 (Md. 1846);
Holland v. Makepeace, 8 Mass. 418 (1812); Hunleth v. Leahy, 146 Mo. 408,
48 S.AV. 459 (1898); Cumberland Bank v. Hann, 18 N.J.L. 222 (1841);
Haley v. Cogdon, 56 Vt. 65 (1884); First Nat'l Bank v. Danser, 70 W. Va.
529,74 S.E. 623 (1912).
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to claim as a set-off a claim against an assignor of the instrument
after the assignor had transferred the instrument to the plaintiff.7 1
In few cases have the courts been called upon to consider
whether a claim against an intermediate party, existing at the time
of the transfer of the instrument, would be available as a set-off
against subsequent assignee of a negotiable instrument. It appears
that the numerical majority of the few cases discussing this point
permit the maker of a negotiable note who has a counterclaim or

set-off against an intermediate holder to use it against a past maturity purchaser, or one otherwise unable to qualify as a holder in

due course.72 In cases where such procedure was permitted, it
appears that this result was only reached by the aid of a statute. In
the cases holding the contrary, no mention was made of any statute.73
Judge Shaw stated in Baxter v. Little what he thought to be
the rule regarding the use of a set-off of a claim against an inter-

mediate party acquired after the transfer of the instrument by the
71Judge Gilbert in HarrisburgTrust Co. v. Shufeldt, 87 Fed. 699 (1898)
summarized the rule as follows: "When a defendant is sued by an assignee of
a chose in action, he cannot plead against the assignee a set-off existed at the
time of the assignment, and belonged to the defendant in good faith, before
notice of such assignment."
Davis v. Miller, 55 Va. 1 (1857).
In the leading English case, Burrough v. Moss, 10 Barn. & Cress.
558, 21 Eng. C. L. R 128 (1830) the court expressed the English view that a
past maturity indorsee of a negotiable bill or note is liable to such equities as
attach on the bill or note itself; and not as to claims arising from extrensic
transactions, such as technical set-off.
The case of Goodrichv. Stanley, 23 Conn. 79 (1854) involved the situation
where payee assigned the note after its maturity date. The maker was notified
of the assignment. The court then denied to the maker the right to set-off an
indebtedness of the payee acquired subsequent to receipt of the notice of the
assignment.
72
Bull v. First Nat'l Bank, 14 Fed. 612, rev'd on other grounds, 123
U. S.105 (1887). Suit on two drafts drawn by defendant in favor of LaDuc
indorsed by LaDuc and delivered to Edison. Edison after maturity sold the
drafts to plaintiff. Bank pleads a set-off against Edison. Held: that by virtue of
a Minnesota statute it is entitled to off-set any valid claim held by it against
Edison while the drafts belonged to him.
Wyman v. Robbins, 51 Ohio St. 98, 37 N.E. 264 (1894). Plaintiff
acquired note from her husband who had acquired after maturity from the
payee. While her husband held the note he was indebted to the maker. Court
inconstruing the statute permitted the maker to use as a set-off against this act
a claim which he held against an intermediate holder.
73 h California court in referrn g to the case of Vinton v. Crowe, 4 Cal.
809, stated: "[I] t was there held that while a note received overdue is
subject to all subsisting equities between make and the payee, there was no
contenance or authority whatever for subjecting it to equities only subsisting
between the maker and an intermediate holder, and such a nile, it was declared, would be both dangerous and absured." Haywood & Co. v. Steams,
89 Cal. 58 (1870).
See, Stocking v. Toulmin, 3 Stew. & P. 85 (Ala. 1832); Hopper v. Spicer,
2 Swan. 495 (Tenn. 1852).
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following statement: "When a negotiable note is indorsed and
transferred after it is due and the defendant relies upon matter of
set-off which he may have against the promisee, he can avail himself only of such matter of defence as existed between himself and
the promisee, at the time of the actual indorsement and transfer
of the note to the holder."7 4 Here the second endorsee acquired
the note after it had been previously dishonored. The maker was
denied the right to set-off a claim which he held against the first
indorsee, except such as existed at the time of the transfer of the
note to the present plaintiff, even though he had no notice of the
transfer at the time he acquired his claim against the first indorsee.
The general rule is that, in an action by an indorsee after
maturity, independent demands against the payee cannot be set off
but only such equities as arise out of the instrument itself.75
A subsequent holder of a nonnegotiable note is not liable to
the maker for damages for breach of a separate and independent
76
contract between original payee and maker.
In conclusion it may be said that in the absence of a statute
the better and more workable view is that a strict set-off is not a
defense to a negotiable instrument and for that reason should not
be available against either an assignee, holder, holder in due course,
or holder with the rights of a holder in due course. The only reasonable exception being that such set-off might be allowed against
an assignee to the extent that the right to a set-off had matured
against the assignor prior to the assignment of the chose and prior
to the time the third party learned of the assignment of the instrument
A claim of recoupment or counterclaim necessarily arises out
of the transaction which gave rise to the instrument.77 For this
reason it would seem proper to permit the use of any claim by way
of recoupment or counterclaim against any transferee of a negotiable instrument other than a holder in due course or a holder with
the rights of a holder in due course. A claim by the way of recoupment or counterclaim should be on a different footing than
that of a set-off. The cases seem so to indicate.
74

47 Mass. (6 Mete.) 7 (1844).
Birmingham Trust & Sav. Co., v. Jackson County Mill Co., 41 Fla.
498,27
7 So. 43 (1899).
6 First State Bank v. Horton, 57 Okla. 702, 157 Pac. 312 (1916).
77 As to claims arising subsequent to the transfer see: Root v. Irwin, 18
Ill.
147 (1856); Downey v. Tharp, 65 Pa. 322 (1869); Baxter v. Little, 47 Mass.
(6 Mete.) 7 (1844).
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